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United States intelligence believes
Mush's removal not to help extremists
New York , Mar 11: American intelligence now believes that even if
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf is removed from power or falls prey
to an assassin's bullet it would not lead to rise in power of extremist
elements, a media report said today.
"If Mr Musharraf were to fall to an assassin's bullet ... It is unlikely
that there would be mass uprisings in Lahore and Karachi, or that a
religious leader in the Taliban mould would rise to power," the New York
Time said quoting American diplomatic and intelligence officials in
Washington.
"Based on the succession plan, the vice chief of the army, Gen Ahsan
Saleem Hyat, would take over as the leader of the army and Mohammedmian
Soomro, an ex-banker, would become president," the report said.
"General Hyat, who is secular like Mr Musharraf, would hold the real
power," it said. "But it is unclear whether General Hyat would be as
adept as Mr Musharraf at keeping various interest groups within the
military in line." The record of Islamic political parties at the polls
over the recent does not suggest any danger of their pulling off an
electoral victory, the paper said.
For years, it said, notion that Musharraf is all that stands between
Washington and a group of nuclear- armed mullahs has dictated just how
far the White House feels it can push him to root out al Qaeda and
Taliban operatives who enjoy a relatively safe existence in Pakistan.
The spectre of Islamic radicals overthrowing Musharraf has also limited
the Bush administration's policy options, taking off the table any ideas
about American military strikes against a resurgent al Qaeda, which has
camps in Pakistani tribal areas, the paper said. The question of how to
handle Musharraf, it said, is critical at a time when intelligence
officials widely agree that the Taliban is expanding its reach in
Pakistan, gradually spreading from remote areas into more settled
regions of the country.
The fear within Washington that Islamic extremism has become a dominant
force in Pakistan, the paper said, has been stoked in part by Musharraf
himself.
It quotes analysts as saying that his warnings are used to maintain a
steady flow of American aid and keep at bay demands from Washington for
democratic reforms.
"He often invokes the dangers of Islamic radicalism when meeting
American officials in Washington and Islamabad, and his narrow escape in
two assassination attempts is frequently cited by President Bush as
evidence of his tenuous grip on power," the paper noted.
While the Islamists would surely take power in any way possible, it
said, an examination of polling data and recent election results however
suspect in a less than democratic country provides little evidence that
Islamists have enough support to take over the country.
The last time Pakistan went to the polls in 2002, religious political
parties received just 11 percent of the vote, compared with more than 28
percent won by the secular party led by former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto.
That election, the paper said, may have even been a high-water mark for
the Islamists, who were capitalizing on surging anti-American sentiment
after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Even though the Iraq war has
also inflamed anti-Western attitudes, these sentiments do not seem to
have translated into electoral gains for Islamist parties. Islamist
politicians, the report noted, received a drubbing in local elections in
2005, gaining less support than expected in their power base in the
tribal areas.
In September, a poll by the International Republican Institute, a
respected organization affiliated with the Republican Party that helps
build democratic institutions in foreign countries, found that just 5.2
per cent of respondents would vote for the main religious party,
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, in national parliamentary elections.
Although the poll found that this party was the most popular in
Baluchistan, the southwestern province where Taliban support is strong,
Islamist leaders lagged far behind both Musharraf and Bhutto, as well as
another former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
"It is also thought to be unlikely that a successful attempt on
Musharraf's life would mean wholesale changes to the power structure of
Pakistani politics," it added.
"I am not particularly worried about an extremist government coming to
power and getting hold of nuclear weapons," the paper quoted Robert
Richer, who was associate director of operations in 2004 and 2005 for
the Central Intelligence Agency as saying.
"If something happened to Musharraf tomorrow, another general would step
in."
American officials were quoted in the report as saying that Pakistan's
intelligence service, the ISI, continues to play a direct role in arming
and financing the Taliban's re-emergence in western Pakistan, and there
are worries about the relationships between some senior military leaders
and Islamist groups. The ties between Islamic militants and Pakistan's
security services are decades old, with the two sides working together
most closely during the mujahadeen battles against the Soviet Army in
Afghanistan in the 1980s, it said, adding that analysts generally agree,
however, that the military remains a largely secular institution that
takes seriously its role as protector of Pakistan's identity and would
not allow Islamists to become the dominant force in Pakistan.
While many in Washington agree that the threat of Islamic militants has
become something of a useful foil for Musharraf, the paper said, there
is a rift about just how the White House should be treating the
Pakistani president.
The money and military hardware from the United States is crucial for
Pakistan's armed forces to keep pace with archrival India, it noted and
added because of this dependency, some officials argue, the Bush
administration has powerful leverage to force Musharraf to crack down on
extremism.
On the other side of the debate, the paper said some State Department
officials said that "while Islamic militants probably would not topple
Musharraf, why roll the dice?"
NewKerala.com
12.3.07 |
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