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Balochistan's
rebels
By Willem Marx
from Prospect Magazine
Is the US
providing covert support to Baloch rebels in Iran? If so, what does this
say about its support for Musharraf in Pakistan?
Willem Marx is a freelance journalist based in New York
The Toyota pick-up truck roared through the green gates into the dusty
walled compound and juddered to a halt inches from a small well. Eight
figures, their faces swathed in cloth, stood up stiffly from their
crouched positions before clambering down. They lifted their weapons
gingerly from the floor where they had lain concealed. I counted five
semi-automatics, a light machine gun and a green rocket-propelled grenade
launcher before the vehicle’s driver slammed his door. Iran’s most wanted
terrorist walked towards me with his hand extended, a dazzlingly white
smile beneath a Pashtun hat.
But 24-year-old Abdulmalik Rigi is not Pashtun, he’s Baloch—an ethnic
minority that straddles an area across southeast Iran, southwest Pakistan
and south Afghanistan. In February, the Iranian city of Zahedan was hit by
a bomb—for which Rigi claimed responsibility—that killed 11 Revolutionary
Guards, and placed Rigi at the top of Tehran’s hitlist. A series of
American media reports had linked Rigi’s guerrilla attacks to a wider
US-sponsored covert war against Iran. Rigi had agreed to meet me, a
western journalist, to publicly refute these allegations, which he says
have been levelled against his group by the mullahs of Iran.
Balochistan is a vast expanse of territory separating the middle east from
the Indian subcontinent (see below—the Baloch region is coloured pink).
The Baloch people are ethnically heterogeneous but united by their
language and culture, and their Sunni Islam faith. In the late 19th
century, the highly tribal Baloch homeland was carved up by British India,
Afghanistan and Persia, and the Baloch have thus never enjoyed a modern
sovereign state. Nevertheless, the difficult terrain kept the Baloch
relatively isolated, allowing them to preserve a centuries-old cultural
heritage, and in both Iran and Pakistan they have offered armed resistance
to central government control since the early 20th century.
Today,
Afghanistan’s chaos has spilled over its southern borders into the
contiguous Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan provinces. Afghan refugees
have been flooding the northern edges of Pakistan’s Baloch territory,
while arms and narcotics smuggling into Iran prop up the local economy
among the largely unemployed Baloch youth. Smuggled Iranian oil products
fuel swathes of Pakistani Balochistan, and convoys of pick-up
trucks—overloaded with diesel barrels—regularly arrive in plain sight at
any one of a dozen border towns inside Pakistani territory. (A veteran
Baloch guerrilla commander told me that a large part of Abdulmalik Rigi’s
revenue comes from tolls levied on illicit trade in the area he controls.
Rigi denied personal involvement in smuggling, but acknowledged that some
members of his organisation might not be so scrupulous).
I witnessed Pakistani policemen accepting bribes from truck drivers
carrying several dozen such barrels, but the security forces here are
disliked for other reasons. According to Pakistan’s Commission for Human
Rights, several hundred ethnic Baloch are missing and unaccounted for in
the province. Some are human rights activists, political leaders and
journalists, but many more are simply ordinary workers picked up at police
checkpoints and never heard from again. I met countless families with
stories of loved ones who had gone missing, they said, for expressing
Baloch nationalist sentiments.
Abdulmalik Rigi and I settled on a shaded mat, surrounded by dwarf palms,
at the outskirts of a small village on the mountainous Pakistan-Iran
border that had been chosen for our rendezvous. As his eight young
fighters sat around, fingering their weapons and laughing at their
leader’s jokes about “cowardly Iranian soldiers,” Rigi told me similar
horror stories from Iranian Balochistan, while denying that he was a
Washington stooge. He claimed to be fighting for Baloch minority rights,
and says he hopes to replace Iran’s current theocracy with a federal
union, a “United States of Iran.” Affable and impassioned, he willingly
discussed his group’s weapons, tactics and martyred members.
What had driven him to fight the Iranian government? I asked. He told me
how at the age of 13 he had come around a corner in Zahedan, his hometown,
and seen the corpses of several young men, strung up from an industrial
crane. It was a common punishment for “counter-revolutionary” behaviour,
he explained, and it compelled him to abandon his urban life and take up
arms.
A day later, 800 miles away across inhospitable deserts and dark granite
mountains, a separate group of Baloch fighters shared their dinner with
me. These men formed part of the growing Baloch Liberation Army, and say
they are engaged in a struggle with Pakistan’s government for the
independence of that country’s Baloch minority. Five hours' hike up a
narrow ravine, they live with their donkeys and their ageing rifles,
occasionally venturing out of their craggy maze to attack military
checkpoints. Their commander, a tall man with a green and black cloth
masking his face, sat on a rock and held forth on the Balochi hatred of
Pakistan’s military elite. His fighters had survived overwhelming
firepower, he said, including “the helicopter gunships that are provided
by America in order to co-operate against Taliban and jihadi
organisations.”
It was recently reported that Pakistan had suggested a barter deal with
the British government: Islamabad would extradite Pakistani citizens
allegedly involved in the July 2005 London bombings, and in return the
British would hand over a group of Baloch men that President Musharraf has
accused of supporting the BLA’s increasingly successful insurgency from
afar. Until now, the British have refused to co-operate, but meanwhile the
US state department has not wavered in its support for Musharraf, despite
the continued unrest and repression occurring across Pakistan. Is there an
inconsistency in American and British support for the government of
Pakistan—with its poor treatment of the Baloch minority—and simultaneous
criticism of Iran for similar transgressions? The US has been learning
valuable lessons from its earlier support of Islamic mujahedin during the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. One is that proxy groups may
one day turn around to bite the hand that feeds them. If the CIA really is
supporting Rigi’s guerrillas in Iran, while simultaneously helping
Musharraf’s army stifle the Baloch nationalist insurgency in Pakistan,
there may be trouble ahead.
From Prospect Magazine 1.8.07 |