The Neglected Insurgency

More pressing developments elsewhere in Pakistan have tended to overshadow the Baloch insurgency in the recent past, but Islamabad is finding it increasingly difficult to crush the rebellion in the province.

 

By Kanchan Lakshman From Outlookindia.com

"We have been Baloch for more than 7000 years. We became Muslim some 1400 years ago, and have been Pakistanis for just 60 years."

-- Unnamed tribal chief in Balochistan,
cited in Himal South Asian, May 2007.

During a visit to the Sui gas fields in Balochistan province on May 10, 2007, President Pervez Musharraf declared that the "security forces are on the verge of wiping out militant camps in Balochistan." Reiterating an amnesty offer to the insurgents, he stated that the government would not take any action against the rebels if they surrendered their arms, but that failure to do so would invite the wrath of the state: "They are our brothers and sisters. Give up weapons and terrorism; otherwise the law will take its course. We will not allow terrorism." Claiming that the security forces had destroyed 65 farari (absconder or rebel) camps, General Musharraf added, "Only three to four rebel camps are left. We will wipe them out too." While accusing the tribal leaders of driving 90,000 Baloch people out into other provinces the President, unsurprisingly, did not mention his regime's errors of omission and commission in Balochistan since 1999.

General Musharraf claimed further that the situation in Balochistan had 'changed considerably', and that the government had converted 25 districts, which were previously considered 'B areas', where the police did not operate, into 'A areas', under direct police jurisdiction. [The British colonial administration divided Balochistan into A and B Areas: the former were under direct British control and administration; in the latter, the British exercised proxy control through the Sardars or tribal chiefs. The system was continued after Independence by the Pakistan Establishment]. On March 31, 2004, General Musharraf had declared that the problem with Balochistan was that only five per cent of the territory of the province was 'A area', while 95 per cent was 'B', and that the entire 'B area' would soon be transformed into 'A area'. Three years down the line, the military regime has succeeded in imposing its writ over much of the province, though the insurgency is by no stretch of imagination over.

On the face of it, it is clear that the province has relatively calmed down after the assassination of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti on August 26, 2006. After Bugti's assassination and till December 31, 2006, thirty-six people, including 28 civilians, died in 128 insurgency-related incidents in Balochistan. Before this, between January 1 and August 26, 2006, approximately 414 persons, including 198 civilians, 134 insurgents and 82 soldiers, had been killed in at least 644 incidents. Violence currently remains at relatively lower levels, with at least 61 persons, including 38 civilians, killed in an estimated 160 insurgency-related incidents in 2007 (till May 31).

Evidently, the insurgency continues to simmer, and other tribal chiefs are yet to give up the cause. There has been a steady stream of bomb and rocket attacks on gas pipelines, railway tracks, power transmission lines, bridges, and communications infrastructure, as well as on military establishments and governmental facilities. Acts of violence are "not confined to a few districts but are taking place in practically all the Baloch districts including Quetta." Indeed, there has been substantial violence in the provincial capital Quetta, with as many as 38 incidents already recorded in 2007. According to an estimate reported in The News on June 2, 2007, over 100 incidents of bomb explosions and rocket-firing have been reported from Quetta, Mastung, Kalat and Khuzdar during the last five months. As many as 24 persons have died and over have been 150 injured in these incidents since January 2007.

Significantly, the insurgents triggered a series of bomb blasts (some reports mentioned more than 12) at Chaghai, the Federal government's testing site of a nuclear device on May 28, 1998. The main railway lines between Quetta and the rest of Pakistan were disabled at two points and there were seven blasts in Quetta alone on May 28. Bomb blasts were also reported from Mastung, Khuzdar, Sui, Kohlu and other cities of Balochistan on May 28-29. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attacks and said "these attacks were to remind Punjabi Pakistanis that, we the sons of the soil will not forget the great injustices and especially the nuclear test in the heart of our Fatherland Balochistan... We will avenge and free our country from Pakistani slavery."

Currently, all 27 districts of Balochistan are affected either by a sub-nationalist tribal insurgency or, separately, by Islamist extremism. Most of the violence in Balochistan is, however, 'nationalist' and there is no co-operation between Islamist militants in pockets in the North and the Baloch nationalist insurgents.

Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and his role in the rebellion is a major element in any narrative on the insurgency in Balochistan. It is now clear that the insurgents erred in their dependency on a single leader. While the risks of co-optation and subjugation by the state exist in the province, it is the absence of a definite second line of leadership that has had the greatest impact on the insurgents. Nevertheless, in recent months, according to journalist Massoud Ansari, "Baloch leaders have tried to buck the trend of historical rivalry in order to target Islamabad as the common enemy. Angry youths from different tribes have come together to take up the gauntlet against the capital. Although not every Baloch is a part of the armed struggle, everyone is seething with anger against what is widely referred to as the 'Punjab-dominated' Federal government." Ansari notes further that "walls across Balochistan today reverberate with graffiti for a 'Greater Balochistan'. A proposed national anthem for an independent Balochistan is currently in circulation, and parallels are regularly drawn with the rumblings in East Pakistan pre-1971."

Rejecting President Musharraf's amnesty offer, the outlawed BLA stated on May 22, 2007, that surrender before the state was not acceptable at any cost. The BLA spokesperson, Biburg Baloch, declared further that they were offended by the way Musharraf had been making fun of Baloch people, asking them to surrender their weapons. If the President does not stop underestimating Baloch fighters and spreading disinformation about their cause, Biburg Baloch threatened, he will be killed or "pushed back to India". He emphasised that the BLA was fighting for complete self-rule, and that its leaders and cadre had been annoyed by the President's public mockery of their struggle when he said that the BLA was gradually giving up arms and joining official ranks. "We warn Musharraf to stop underestimating us. Every Baloch is a part of the BLA and our struggle has greatly expanded across the province."

The BLA spokesperson emphatically rejected the impression that external forces, particularly India or Afghanistan, supported the BLA. "If we had external support, we would not be in such a deplorable condition today. The government is using brute force against our people. We are resisting the state but if we had assistance, General Musharraf would not dare to step on Baloch land," he noted. He also rejected Islamabad's claim that the government had eliminated Baloch fugitive camps, adding that the number of camps was increasing in several parts of Balochistan.

Wadera Alam Khan, another spokesperson for the Baloch insurgents, claimed that, while his organisation had no links with the BLA, all Baloch militant organisations shared a common goal: to provide Balochistan its just rights and resist the use of state force against innocent and unarmed Baloch people. Various organisations like the BLA, Balochistan Liberation Front, Nonial Tigers and Baloch Chappamar Tanzeem are fighting for this common goal, he disclosed, adding, "We will not negotiate with the government. The Pakistani military should disarm before it asks us to do so. Claims that only a few camps are remaining are baseless. We fired six rockets in Dera Bugti when Musharraf was visiting. Where is the writ of the government Musharraf is harping about?"

A majority of the insurgents have refused to accept the amnesty offer (actual data regarding the number of surrenders under the amnesty scheme is unavailable) and are determined to continue the rebellion. Nawabzada Brahamdagh Bugti, one of Nawab Akbar Bugti's grandsons, stated that the amnesty offer would not help end the Baloch resistance, which was bound to spread all over the province: "The Baloch resistance is not confined to just two tehsils [revenue divisions]. Militants are forcefully resisting government Forces in vast areas of Balochistan." Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo, secretary-general of the National Party, also stated that the Baloch people were offended even at the suggestion of "surrendering arms" and the tone in which General Musharraf had made the offer was insulting. "Such threats are hurled only when someone is fighting a foreign enemy or those who are against the state. This is not the case in Balochistan. People are struggling for their legitimate rights," he said. Habib Jalib, secretary-general of the Balochistan National Party (BNP-Mengal), also rejected the amnesty offer, declaring: "generals who were conducting the military operation should themselves retreat, instead of asking the Baloch people to surrender."
On May 12, 2007, a Daily Times report noted

In the last 56 years, thirteen non-Baloch governors have been appointed to govern Balochistan, each of whom has failed to respond to the peoples' real needs and has enforced what the Baloch regarded as the state's policy of repression. Repeating the same policy, the governor, inspector general police, inspector general Frontier Corps, heads of military and civil intelligence agencies and provincial secretaries have been sent from the 'outside'.

President Musharraf, it said, has carried out his 'surgical strikes' in Balochistan and used religion to rule the province. More pressing developments elsewhere in Pakistan have tended to overshadow the Baloch insurgency in the recent past, but Islamabad is finding it increasingly difficult to crush the rebellion in the province. Even as the military regime claims relative success in Balochistan, the more insidious problem of Islamist extremism in the North West Frontier Province has generated a new crisis for Islamabad. Further, despite constant military operations and Akbar Bugti's death in August 2006, the insurgents still retain substantial firepower and capacities to take on the might of the state. The levels of violence in Balochistan have diminished significantly, but the present ebb in the insurgency may be a prelude to another surge, as the Baloch groups pull together after the reverses of the recent past. 7.6.07

Kanchan Lakshman is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal