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Uneasy Lies The Head
By Vikram Sood is former Secretary, Research & Analysis Wing
Article
From
Hindustan Times Conventional wisdom has it that Pervez
Musharraf is in a spot of bother these days with so many troubles erupting
simultaneously. Even the mentor in Washington is uneasy at the way things
are not working out in Afghanistan and wants Musharraf to do more. There
has been violence and killings in Karachi and Peshawar, Balochistan
remains restive, the Islamists continue with their protests in Islamabad,
while Waziristan simmers with surface calm. Even democracy was rearing its
head in unexpected ways. The Taliban ideologues have spread
to the ‘settled areas’ of NWFP like Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu. In
Charsadda, the home of the legendary Badshah Khan and his heirs Wali Khan
and Asfandyar, the Taliban have burnt CD video shops and music shops
demanding that they show the CDs they want to be shown and a strict
observance of Islamic laws. Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Sherpao, who
belongs to Charsadda, escaped an assassination attempt. The bastion of the
liberal secular Pathans is under attack. What we have is a highly
Talibanised belt on the unstable and porous Afghan-Pakistan border
spreading outwards from there. In Afghanistan, the Taliban are getting
closer to Kabul. In Pakistan, they have strongholds in northern
Balochistan and the NWFP and have reached Islamabad. The
General would like the world to believe that all is under control in
Balochistan. It is just that the media have been frightened into silence
after six journalists were shot dead last year. The arrests of numerous
over-ground activists have not led to the arrests of the underground
activists. Attacks on government troops, bomb blasts and mine explosions
continue. Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal, the veteran Baloch leader, a most
prominent leader of the Baloch struggle, confirmed in an interview
recently that the Baloch were not willing to live under the tutelage of
Punjab-Pakistan. The Baloch were struggling for complete independence and
an armed struggle was the only way, he clarified. These are strong and
brave words even if made to an English language magazine.
Musharraf is aware that his career is at a crucial point as it is
‘election year’ in Pakistan. In the US too, the Republicans know that they
need an exit from Iraq and Afghanistan ahead of next year’s presidential
elections. Musharraf can render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s, like a
prominent Al-Qaeda leader (maybe, al Zawahiri) at an opportune moment.
This could help the US declare victory in the war on terror and go home.
Musharraf can also pursue his proposal for a Muslim peace-keeping force in
Iraq, making himself indispensable to the Americans. Many
Pakistanis believe that the Lal Masjid episode was meant to be Musharraf’s
insurance and his price for a secure future. He was the 21st century
Casabianca who stood on the deck while the fires of radical Islam raged
around him. The dangers he faced for carrying out instructions from his
American allies and the risks he was taking had to be compensated.
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry’s obduracy was not part of
the script and the drama went awry. Suddenly, Pakistani
politicians discovered that they had a rallying point and the massive
demonstrations in Lahore sent Musharraf into a panic. The Chief Justice’s
march had to be stopped because a similar demonstration in Karachi would
challenge the army’s supremacy, which would be blasphemy, especially now.
How long this defiance lasts and how it faces up to the inevitable radical
Islamic response is debatable. But with more than 50 (mostly Pathans) —
killed in the MQM-led violence in Karachi, one wonders if the price paid
for taking succour with fellow mohajirs may be too high for Musharraf in
the long-run. There is seething anger against the MQM in the Punjab and
NWFP and revenge attacks by Pathans are par for the course. Musharraf may
have stopped Chief Justice Chaudhry’s rally in Karachi but it has left him
floundering for answers. The demonstrations in Lahore and
killings in Karachi were more an expression of anger against years of
colonisation by the army. Ayesha Siddiqa, in her latest book Military Inc,
highlights how the army has developed a stranglehold over all aspects of
life in Pakistan, corporate and political. From the early days, the civil
bureaucracy, the feudals and the politicians used the army to balance each
other out, until a serving General Ayub Khan was invited to take over as
the Defence Minister. The rest is history. Over time, the
armed forces became a predatory force with an unrestrained and unauditable
transfer of public assets and funds to private coffers mostly for the
senior echelons of the armed forces and their favourites. The Fauji
Foundation and the Army Welfare Trust are two of the largest conglomerates
in Pakistan. But no one really knows the financial assets controlled by
Pakistan’s military business enterprises. The armed forces have been
involved in massive land grabs all over the country — usually the most
fertile or most profitable. And they have access to all lucrative civilian
assignments. Such a force will want to preserve its primacy
in perpetuity. In fact, it has to do all it can to preserve this;
otherwise, the reaction could be devastating. And primacy requires a
threat. At the same time, such a force is unlikely to be willing to fight
a real war as it has far too much to lose. This fighting would be left to
the jehadis — misguided and foolish but effective and dispensable. For
India, it means that the jehadi option is a permanent part of the Pak
army’s plans. Pakistan, thus, is not a victim of terrorism,
as the Americans would have us believe. But it is a recipient of American
largesse of about $ 1 billion annually, ostensibly for fighting America’s
war on terror. Pakistan is a victim of its own crony politics, crony
economics and sponsored jehad. Years of warped politics have left the
State with an imbalanced power structure heavily in favour of the military
and its hangers-on who have vested interests in the continuance of the
present system. This has created a society sharply divided on ethnic and
sectarian lines and deeply suspicious of one another. There
are implications for India. It is virtually certain that before the vote
in the US in November 2008, the Americans will declare victory and leave a
Talibanised Afghanistan under Pakistan’s supervision. It would not be
important at that time if Musharraf were weakened so long as the army
remains paramount and is able to exploit any domestic political
arrangement worked out in its favour. Pakistan will hope to formalise the
Durand Line and exercise unfettered control over Afghanistan. It is
unlikely that the Pushtuns will accept a formalisation of the Durand Line.
Instability could exacerbate. This would not bring peace to the warring
factions in Afghanistan. This could mean Indian consulates
in Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad would be closed and a loss of
many good friends in Afghanistan. We will have very little to show for the
hundreds of millions of dollars invested in Afghanistan. We should be
prepared to see the revival of terrorist camps in Khost and resurgence of
terrorism in India. Bomb attacks on the Samjhauta Express, the Mumbai
metro, Varanasi and Hyderabad could be part of this scheme for mainland
India.
India would have to be prepared for the inevitable departure of the
Americans and a Talibanised neighbourhood. Islamic or dictatorial,
Pakistan’s future and Musharraf’s longevity look uncertain today. 28.5.07 |