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India Walks
into Pak trap to discredit Baloch's - International Terrorism Monitor -
Paper No. 201
By B Raman -
March 08, 2007
I have written many articles on the
so-called India-Pakistan Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism.
In the article
written on October 23, 2006, I had, inter alia, stated as follows:
"Does the
Havana Agreement indicate a change in the
policies hitherto followed by Pakistan? From a study of the statements and
comments of Pakistani officials on the significance of the Havana
statement, the following points are clear:
- There has been no change in
Pakistan's policy of not co-operating with India in respect of terrorism
in J&K. It continues to insist that what has been going on in J&K is a
freedom struggle and that participants in the freedom struggle cannot be
projected as terrorists.
- There has been no change in
Pakistan's policy of denying the involvement of Pakistani nationals in
acts of terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.
- There has been no change
either in denying the presence in Pakistani territory of the Indian
Muslims and non-Muslims involved in terrorist acts of the past for whom
red corner notices have periodically been issued by the INTERPOL.
- However, Pakistan has an open
mind in respect of the
Mumbai blasts of July 11, 2006, and future acts of terrorism and
might help in the Indian investigation if the evidence produced by India
is satisfactory.
- Even this would depend on
India's reciprocity in instances in which Pakistan seeks Indian
assistance. There have been hints that Pakistan would expect this
reciprocity in respect of its investigation of the acts of violence by
the Baloch nationalist elements."
In the article
written on November 16, 2006, I had,
inter alia, stated as follows:
"Rushing into important decisions affecting
national security without a careful examination of their implications and
subsequently tying itself in knots while seeking to provide ex post facto
justification for the decisions, when they prove controversial, have been
among the defining characteristics of the present Government in New Delhi.
"One saw an example of it in respect of the
Indo-US nuclear deal
of July, 2005. We are presently seeing another example of it in
respect of the setting-up of a joint count-terrorism mechanism with
Pakistan "to consider counter-terrorism measures, including through
regular and timely sharing of information.
"At a time when, as a result of the public
diplomacy systematically mounted by us, the international community has
started agreeing with us that what is happening in J&K is also terrorism
by Pakistani organisations, we have failed to specify in the statement
that the joint mechanism would cover all acts of terrorism wherever they
take place. Pakistan would now contend that the mechanism is meant to deal
with only terrorism and not what it projects as the freedom-struggle in
J&K."
The first meeting of this mechanism was held
at Islamabad on
March 6 and 7,2007. Each delegation was headed by an officer of the
rank of Additional Secretary from their respective Foreign Offices and
included two intelligence officers of the rank of Joint Secretary
representing the internal and external intelligence agencies of the two
countries. Before discussing the outcome of this meeting, certain
observations relating to the past would be in order. This is the third
attempt by the two countries for a dialogue on counter-terrorism. The
previous two attempts were made when Rajiv Gandhi and Shri Chandrasekhar
were Prime Ministers between 1988 and 1991.
Rajiv Gandhi adopted a two-track approach.
The first track consisted of secret meetings between the heads of the
Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), India's external intelligence agency, and
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Three meetings were
held---two under Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 and the third under Chandrasekhar in
1991. The second track consisted of periodic open meetings between
intelligence---internal and external--- officers of the two countries,
with the Home Secretaries leading the respective delegations. Two meetings
were held under Rajiv Gandhi. In the second and last meeting held in 1989,
the Indian delegation was led by Shri Naresh Chandra, the then Home
Secretary.
When Rajiv Gandhi initiated this exercise,
the only complaint of India
against Pakistan related to its sponsorship of Khalistani terrorism in
Punjab. Widespread terrorism had not yet broken out in Jammu & Kashmir
(J&K). Dawood Ibrahim and his mafia gang were operating from Dubai and had
no base in Pakistani territory. Pakistan had given shelter in its
territory to hijackers of the Dal Khalsa, who had hijacked Indian planes
to Lahore between 1981 and 1984, Lal Singh alias Manjit Singh of the
International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), Canada, who, according to the
US' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), was involved in a plot to kill
Rajiv Gandhi in the US in June,1985, and Talwinder Singh Parmar of the
Babbar Khalsa, Canada, who was involved in the blowing-up of an Air India
aircraft (Kanishka) off the Irish coast in June,1985, in which nearly 300
innocent civilians perished. It had set up training camps in its territory
for the Khalistani terrorists. It had diverted to the Khalistanis some of
the arms and ammunition and explosives given by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) for issue to the Afghan Mujahideen.
The meetings held under Rajiv Gandhi and
Chandrasekhar were, therefore, confined to asking Pakistan to extend
mutual legal assistance as required under the INTERPOL by handing over the
hijackers, Lal Singh and Parmar for trial and prosecution in India and to
stop training and arming Khalistani terrorists in Pakistani territory.
Pakistan admitted the presence of the hijackers in its territory. It could
not have denied it because the whole world had watched the arrival of the
hijacked aircraft in Lahore and the pictures of the hijackers on the TV
secreen. However, it refused to hand them over to India. It contended that
under the International Civil Aviation Conventions relating to hijacking,
it was its responsibility to prosecute and try the hijackers. It claimed
that it was doing so. It did hold a sham trial in which they were
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, but instead of sending them to
jail, it allowed them to live in the Nankana Sahib gurudwara in Lahore.
Pakistan totally denied the presence of Lal Singh and Parmar in its
territory or of training camps for the Khalistani terrorists. The only
outcome of this exercise was that the ISI pushed back into India four Sikh
deserters of the Indian Army, who had crossed over into Pakistan and
sought asylum.
After peremptorily dismissing the Indian
complaints and requests, the Pakistani authorities presented to the Indian
officials what they described as a detailed dossier on alleged Indian
sponsorship of terrorism in Sindh. The Pakistani authorities manipulated
the discussions in such a manner that most of the time was taken away by
their dossier. At that time, the movement for an independent Sindhu Desh
led by the late G. M. Syed was in full swing all over Sindh. The Pakistan
Army was having difficulty in controlling it. The ISI gave a copy of this
dossier to Hussain Haqqani, then a journalist close to the Pakistani
intelligence and now an academic living in the US, and asked him to go to
India and persuade the "India Today", a respected weekly, to publish it.
Haqqani came to India, contacted a journalist of "India Today" and
requested him to have it published. He also promised more details. The
journalist contacted the R&AW and asked for its comments. It pointed out
to him that the whole dossier had been fabricated by the ISI in order to
divert attention from India's complaints relating to Khalistani
terrorism. It was not published by the journal.
Hussain Haqqani also contacted a number of
old Indian friends of Benazir Bhutto, who had studied with her in the UK
and the US, and allegedly made enquiries about her personal life and her
contacts in India. Her Pakistan People's Party came to know of his alleged
enquiries through its sources in the Pakistani High Commission in New
Delhi. Its Executive Committee met in Islamabad and strongly condemned his
activities. The Government of India realised that instead of co-operating
with India in counter-terrorism, Pakistan was misusing the mechanism to
discredit the freedom struggle of the Sindhis as terrorism sponsored by
India and also to discredit Pakistani political leaders, who were critical
of its army, by projecting them as Indian agents. The entire exercise for
a counter-terrorism dialogue was called off.
Almost 14 years later, we have repeated the
mistake exactly in the same way as we did in the late 1980s and early
1990s.In December, 2005, the Baloch nationalists launched their third
freedom struggle. Their first struggle was launched immediately after the
partition of India in 1947. The second after the liberation of Bangladesh
in 1971. Both those struggles were ruthlessly suppressed by the Pakistan
Army and the ISI. The third freedom struggle has been picking up momentum
despite similar suppression and air strikes. The Pakistan Army and Air
Force brutally killed Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the Baloch nationalist
leader, and some of his followers through an airstrike in the Bugti area
of Balochistan in August, 2006. This led to widespread anti-Punjabi and
anti-Army agitation all over Balochistan by the Balochs. Since then, the
Pakistan Army and its ISI have mounted an exercise to discredit the
freedom struggle and the Baloch nationalist leaders by projecting it as a
terrorist movement sponsored by India and the nationalist leaders as
Indian agents.
After Dr. Manmohan Singh, our Prime
Minister, agreed with Gen.Pervez Musharraf during their meeting at Havana
in September last year, to set up this joint counter-terrorism mechanism,
I have been repeatedly cautioning in my writings and speeches that the
Pakistani authorities would misuse this mechanism to discredit the Baloch
freedom struggle by projecting it as an Indian-sponsored terrorist
movement just as they sought to have the Sindhi freedom struggle
discredited during the dialogue of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
That seems to be exactly what they did at
the just concluded first meeting of the new mechanism. They tried to keep
the focus of their presentations, publicity and propaganda concentrated on
their so-called dossier on Balochistan after having derisively dismissed
Indian requests relating to the terrorist strikes in Mumbai's suburban
trains in July last year in which 184 Indian nationals were killed and in
the Samjauta Express
near Panipet last month in which 22 Pakistani nationals and 27 Indian
nationals were killed.
They tried to divert attention from the
Mumbai terrorist strikes of July, 2006, which was the third major mass
casualty terrorism suffered by Indians since Pakistan started sponsoring
Indian terrorist groups. The first was the blowing up of the Kanishka
aircraft in June,1985 and the second the
Mumbai explosions of
March,1993. What they did was to have a terrorist strike by jihadi
terrorists carried out in the Samjauta Express before the meeting of this
mechanism and then exploit it as an example of Indian inaction against
terrorism endangering Pakistani lives.
There was another worrisome aspect of the
meeting of the mechanism and the events preceding it. Those closely
monitoring comments in Pakistan would have noticed a wave of orchestrated
insinuations that the alleged Indian inaction was due to the fact that
so-called Hindu extremists were involved in the attack in the Samjauta
Express. This mischievous campaign has two purposes--- to create a divide
between the Muslims and the Hindus in India and tro prepare the ground for
a Pakistani stand that Musharraf's implementation of his commitment of
January, 2004, not to allow any terrorism against India from any territory
controlled by Pakistan, would depend upon a similar Indian commitment not
to allow its territory to be used by the so-called Hindu extremists
against Pakistan and its nationals.
One continues to feel disturbed by the kind
of spins being disseminated by the Government and Delhi-based analysts
projecting the first meeting of the mechanism in a positive light while
willfully suppressing the worrisome aspects of it.
(The writer is
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New
Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.
E-mail:
itschen36@gmail.com)
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