Islamabad’s flawed Balochistan strategy
By Dr Haider K Nizamani

The dogged presence of the Pashtun question in Balochistan, the Brohi-Baloch difference, the class formation of the Baloch society, a lack of effective urban middle class among the Baloch, inter and intra-clan conflicts among them etc are all being exploited by Islamabad to hold the insurgency in check


The tale of two visits that took place in the second week of January is a symbolic representation of the unresolved tension between the strategy to portray a ‘soft image’ of Pakistan and the coercive means state-managers employ to address political issues.

On Jan 11, the government flew a planeload of diplomats to Gwadar to see in person the progress being made in Balochistan. A couple of days before that, however, a less flamboyant visit by a Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) representative to a Karachi prison testified to the inhuman condition in which former chief minister of Balochistan, Akhtar Mengal, is being kept while he is tried by an anti-terrorist court within the precincts of the jail. The court on January 19 found it appropriate to deny the HRCP representative the privilege to observe the trial.

Unfortunately, Akhtar Mengal is not an isolated example of a Baloch accused of harboring treacherous views about Pakistan. While the elite in Islamabad quietly enjoys the fruits of ‘enlightened moderation’ while the sky above some parts of Balochistan rattles with the noise of helicopter gun-ships which seek to cleanse Balochistan of ‘traitors’.

The ‘soft-image’ mantra and the coercive state apparatus are two sides of the same coin. The former is the social face of a modernising regime; the latter an example of the limits of political elasticity of the military regime.

Military action in Balochistan in the name of development and eradicating traitors includes intimidation, coercion, arrests, torture and killings of the Baloch (this information is now well-recorded). While citizens are being catalogued by NADRA in every minute detail, central authorities are unable to provide reliable and verifiable figures regarding human beings who are affected by the military action in Balochistan.

Authoritarianism has a history of well over half-century in Pakistan. It is not Pervez Musharraf’s doing and he is not going to undo it. Prior to 1972, treason was the favourite stick to smack Bengali politicians. When Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League in 1966 came up with the Six-Point manifesto, then central government — led by Ayub Khan — put him and his cohorts behind bars under the banner of Agartala Conspiracy case. Fast forward by four decades and you have Akhtar Mengal shackled in a Karachi prison.

The killing of Akbar Bugti last year may still be fresh in many minds, but if one reads the narrative of Baloch nationalist historiography, their roadmap would have signposts like hanging of Nauroz Khan’s two sons in 1960 in Sukkur and Hyderabad jails. Prisons of Sindh coincidentally become places of choice to incarcerate agitating Baloch high-profile leaders. Akbar Bugti ironically was on the side of Z A Bhutto during the military operation in Balochistan in the mid-1970s when the triumvirate of Marri, Mengal, Bizenjo was tried on charges of treason in Hyderabad jail.

The policy of military action as a solution to the Balochistan crisis not only harms Balochistan, it would have a lasting negative impact on the Pakistan army as well.

Federation in name but an excessively over-centralised state in practice run mainly by the army has often been incapable of negotiating political solutions with the representatives of the constituent units forming Pakistan. Balochistan is the arch-example of a province whose Baloch community perceives it as totally marginalised in the current political economy of Pakistan. Even official figures acknowledge that Balochistan comprises Pakistan’s most underdeveloped districts; it is a region with higher number of people living below the poverty line than the national average; the Baloch are outnumbered outrageously in the public sector; and, this despite the fact that the province is mineral-rich and provides most of the natural gas that keeps the country running while those benefits are absent from Balochistan.

According to the government, the blame for Balochistan’s underdevelopment lies on the doorsteps of a handful of sardars who do not let the ordinary Baloch enjoy the fruits of modernisation. The answer lies in physically crushing and psychologically humiliating the anti-government sardars and their supporters to pave the way for development. The assumption is that the superior military force and select cooption will yield the desired results. The reality, alas, is different.

The dogged presence of the Pashtun question in Balochistan, the Brohi-Baloch difference, the class formation of the Baloch society, a lack of effective urban middle class among the Baloch, inter and intra-clan conflicts among them etc are all being exploited by Islamabad to hold the insurgency in check. The preferred mode of military solution built on the debris of these factors will only offer a chimera of victory costing heavily to both sides.

The frequent use of violent and coercive means is not only going to scar the Baloch populace, but brutalise the military and the paramilitary forces of Pakistan. These forces are not trained to police. They are trained to view the opponent as a ‘danger’ that ought to be conquered and decimated. Even in the best-case scenario, armed forces may overcome the Baloch insurgents but in the process they will leave the impression of being an outside force and will return with the image of the Baloch as traitors that need to be put in place. This is a recipe for national disaster, not nation building.

If discerning eyes in Islamabad’s current ruling elite are looking for a workable solution to the apparently intractable crisis like the one in Balochistan, they may gain some insight by looking at the record of the post-Zia-ul Haq civilian-cum-democratic governments from 1989 to 1999. The Benazir and Nawaz duo can be faulted for many things but one success they had was to dampen the sub-national sentiments by incorporating them in mainstream politics. Veteran nationalists like Ajmal Khattak and Akbar Bugti and scions of people like Ghaus Bux Bizenjo and G M Syed became part of the Muslim League-led coalition.

In today’s widening gap between Islamabad and the Baloch, Akhtar Mengal represents one end and Pervez Musharraf the other of the spectrum. The unwelcome presence of a huge number of military and paramilitary forces in the province has all the ingredients of converting Balochistan into a bleeding wound for Pakistan. Amid this bleak scenario there is a good sign. Ordinary people outside Balochistan, including organisations that have presence in the Punjab, oppose the military solution. They expressed their dismay quite vociferously last year although it did not prevent tragedies from happening.

All such forces should step up their pressure on Islamabad to seek a political solution in the province. Let’s not leave it just to the officials of the HRCP to be concerned about people like Akhtar Mengal’s plight.

The writer teaches at the Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver Canada and can be reached at hnizamani@hotmail.com