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Democracy & federalism
By Anwar Syed |
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The demand for "greater" provincial autonomy than that prevalent at any given time is as old as Pakistan itself. It is rooted in the country's ethnic and cultural diversity, awareness of distinct identities in its regions, and a sense of deprivation, even victimization, on the part of many influential politicians in its smaller provinces.
Opposition to it comes from historical tradition, and partly from an apprehension that a fuller recognition of these distinct identities might incline them toward separatism and secession.
In British India the provinces were the creatures of the central government that could abolish them, change their boundaries, join one with another, or establish new ones. The Government of India Act of 1935, as implemented after the 1937 elections, gave them limited autonomy within an essentially unitary system. This pattern remained largely intact even after independence..
With the decline of feudalism and rise of the modern state, territories which were not vast in size and whose people were relatively homogeneous, were made into unitary states-often by the force of arms. In some cases, they came together voluntarily. Thus, following their declaration of independence, the thirteen American "colonies" entered first a confederal and later a federal union. Acting through their representatives, who framed the constitution of 1787, they determined the scope of federal authority. Each one of them was free to join or stay out of the proposed union. In still other instances, the departing colonial power "bestowed" a federal or quasi-federal governmental system upon the country it had been ruling.
Notwithstanding the historical tradition and a fairly general acceptance of the 1973 Constitution, which spelled out the current federal system in Pakistan, the demand for a larger measure of provincial autonomy persists. Consider also that the highly centralized state has failed, or run into serious trouble, almost everywhere and especially in the developing world. The stress now is on decentralization of authority and power. Acting wisely, the government of the United Kingdom, a unitary state, has recently conceded considerable autonomy to Scotland and Wales (including the right to have their own "parliaments") as a way of honouring and accommodating their distinct identities.
How much provincial autonomy will do in Pakistan? A radical answer to this question appeared in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's "Six Points," which would have converted Pakistan into a confederation. The "centre," under his plan, would have had partial charge of
defence, foreign affairs, currency and a couple of other matters. Lacking any revenue raising authority, it would have met its expenses out of subventions provided by the provincial governments. (Such indeed was the case in America under the Articles of Confederation.).
More recently, Mumtaz Bhutto has periodically come out to advocate a confederal system for Pakistan. Sardar Ataullah Mengal in Balochistan adopts a somewhat similar position when he proposes equal representation for all of the provinces in both houses of parliament.
The only confederation in modern times was the one in America (1781-1789), and we know that it did not work well at all, which was the principal reason for its replacement by a federal union. Nor is there reason to expect that it will work any better in Pakistan. Moreover, while there may be considerable popular support for a larger measure of autonomy in the smaller provinces, there is none to speak of for a confederation, except among the separatists. The great majority of people in the provinces wish to remain Pakistanis - if politics will let them - even as they value their local and regional identities.
The state in Pakistan has been a mix - or, if you will, a hodgepodge - of federal and unitary forms. During British rule provincial autonomy was nominal and the system, basically unitary, subordinated the provinces to the
centre. Not only the spirit and ethos, but many of the specifics of that old system have remained operative after independence, more so during periods of military rule. Pakistan must be a genuine federation, not a unitary state, and not a confederation.
A major characteristic of a federal state is that its constituent units, their territorial boundaries, and their status as bodies politic exist as a matter of right and not as a gift from the union. They have come together because interests that they share will be served better through joint, rather than separate, action. The exact division of functions between them and the union is not an issue of principle but a matter of practicality and common sense. It is common sense, for instance, that responsibility for
defence, foreign relations, currency, regulation of defence-related industries and inter-provincial commerce, protecting the environment, communications, and the enforcement of laws relating to these matters, should be placed with the union.
There would have been no need for the units to form a union had they been able to perform these functions independently of one another. By mutual agreement they might confer additional responsibilities upon the federal government. An essential point here being that the specific allotment of powers and functions to the union must have at least the implicit approval of its constituent units. Second, the latter must have adequate revenue raising authority to meet the cost of performing the functions that fall within their jurisdiction. Resort should be made to federal grants-in-aid as little as possible, which means also that federal revenues should correspond roughly to the union's own needs.
The maintenance of a genuine federal system is not assured simply by the specification of central and provincial powers and functions in a constitution. It depends also on law and tradition relating to centralization. One of the more serious impediments to provincial autonomy in Pakistan has always been the central control over civil servants and police officers occupying key positions in provincial governments. Even as they serve the latter, they act as agents of the centre and may actually defeat provincial policies if the centre opposes them. Provincial autonomy will not work unless provincial governments have exclusive authority to hire, advance, discipline, and dismiss their employees.
Centralization is the first cousin of authoritarianism both of which spill over into the entire political system. For instance, political parties in Pakistan are also centralized. Just as the central government can dismiss a provincial government, the central organ of a political party can dismiss or suspend its officers and councils at the provincial level. Federalism will not work in government unless its core idea of decentralization is carried over to political parties and other organs of civil society.
Lastly, federalism is inextricably linked with democracy, which requires the powers that be to let their adversaries do their political work unhindered. But the "powers that be" in the highly centralized state of Pakistan have never allowed their opponents to function in peace and freedom; especially the ones who commanded substantial popular support in their respective areas. For instance, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abdul Wali Khan in the
NWFP, Ataullah Mengal, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. Khair Bakhsh Marri in Balochistan,
G.M. Syed and many other "nationalists" in Sindh were kept in prison or sent into exile for long periods of time. How can men such as these become anything other than autonomists, if not separatists and secessionists? In Pakistan democracy, decentralization, and federalism have to go together.
On the other hand, if it is true, as some observers suggest, that the present government's "devolution" plan is intended to emasculate the provincial governments and further empower the
centre, the issue of provincial autonomy may once again grow to be a monster that threatens our national integrity.
Dawn.com 4.7.01 |
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